



Dissenting voices within political theory Voegelin’s quest for symbols 
and Strauss’s search for the philosopher
Abstract: The paper summarizes the nature of Eric Voegelin’s and Leo Strauss’s methodological ap-
proaches to the study of the history of political thought, in particular, the Western political thought. The 
paper concludes that in both cases the thinkers stray away from the mainstream, which is currently rep-
resented by contextualism. However, in their dissenting voices both authors take very different routes. 
Voegelin focuses on political symbols which are grounded in the metaphysical experience of their crea-
tors, and Strauss focuses on the perennial question of philosophy and classical, discursive rationality 
as the criterion of philosophical inquiry. They also differ in their opinions on the role of the political 
philosopher. For Voegelin, the philosopher is a defender or a co-creator of political creeds. For Strauss 
s/he is mainly the educator of politically savvy youths and, above all, the defender of philosophy as the 
most noble pursuit of the mind. The paper concludes by pointing out the importance and prominence 
of both thinkers.
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Introduction1
There is a contemporary consensus on the highly historical and contextual approach to political philosophy. This consensus is especially strong in Europe and was partly 
derived from the tradition of the Cambridge School. The seminal article that puts forwards 
the methodological manifesto of this group of scholars is Quentin Skinner’s piece entitled: 
“Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” (1969, pp. 3–51). In the text, Skin-
ner tries to defend political thought both from reducing it to a mere result of the underlying 
economic factors and turning it into a set of timeless philosophical questions. In the New 
World this approach was discussed in the famous polemic between J. G. A. Pocock (1975, 
pp. 385–401) – a historian of ideas inspired by the Cambridge School, and Harvey Mans-
field (1975, pp. 372–384) – a talented student of Leo Strauss, who like Strauss defended 
the perennial character of the questions political philosophy asks.
It is, indeed, interesting that in the modern study of political philosophy the vener-
able European centers, which formulated the historical and contextual approach, found 
dissenters mainly on the other side of the Atlantic. At the same time, the dissenting 
voices were often those of European scholars who found a very responsive audience2 
1 This article has been written within the research project: „Podstawowa literatura przedmiotu 
a kształt współczesnej politologii. Political Science, Politische Wissenchaft i Politologija w ujęciu 
porównawczym” (DEC-2012/05/B/HS5/00597) – financed by the National Science Center in Poland.
2 I explore the deeply rooted American tradition of anti-historicism and the proclivity to produce 
a philosophy of natural rights and attract anti-historicist thinkers in another article (see: Kuź, 2013).
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in the USA. Two of the critics of the Cambridge School in particular became prominent 
because of their unique methodological approaches to the history of political philosophy. 
Those thinkers are: Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss.
In their rejection of contextualism in thinking about political ideas, Voegelin and 
Strauss up to a point resembled John Rawls, whose analytical philosophy became anoth-
er famous American response to European historicality. This paper will, however, only 
mention Rawls in passing. This is mainly for three reasons. Firstly, Rawlsian political 
philosophy is not too deeply concerned with tradition. It has its own language and logic 
that connects concepts that are, indeed, sui generis. In other words, Rawls did not argue 
about Plato in the sense Strauss, Voegelin and Pocock did, he was self-sufficient and 
became his own great philosopher, with all the drawbacks and the advantages of this pre-
carious position. Secondly, a detailed discussion of Rawls’s approach to history cannot 
be conducted in the confines of one, brief paper. Thirdly, Rawls did not share the same 
cultural and educational background that Strauss and Voegelin had in common, and thus 
there are good reasons for discussing the two together, and in separation from Rawls.
Nevertheless, for all their peculiarities Strauss, Voegelin and Rawls had one important 
feature in common. They all wanted to escape something Strauss called ‘historicism’, 
they all wanted to find in political philosophy something that is ‘simply’ true, rather than 
contingent on historical context. Both Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss formed their own 
schools of the study of history of political thought. Those schools are still relatively pow-
erful but, nevertheless, situated on the fringes of the contextualist mainstream. In a way, 
both Strauss and Voegelin focus on a politico-philosophical problem, albeit in different 
ways. Hence the rivalry (and perhaps some bitterness) between the ‘Straussians’ and the 
‘Voegelinians’ (see: Sandoz, 2006, pp. 120–126).
This paper highlights some of the main points in this dispute with special focus on the 
relations between transcendental symbols and the concept of the political. Moreover, it 
discusses the divergent intellectual anthropologies present in the writings of Strauss and 
Voegelin. According to this analysis, for Voegelin all politics becomes voiced through 
symbols. Political symbolisms (systems of symbols), in turn, are generated through 
a process Voegelin calls differentiation. However, at the base of every differentiation 
one always finds its “experiential basis” – i.e. what the political thinker believes to be 
the experience of the transcendental. For Voegelin this experiential basis of being is very 
ecumenical, both everyday politics and complex political theories participate in it alike. 
The political philosopher is thus working within the same symbolisms as the rest of the 
society, s/he, however, understands them at a slightly deeper and perhaps more ‘mysti-
cal’ level. Voegelin considers a thinker who does not follow this pattern an intellectually 
dishonest impostor, who is interested only in power for power’s sake. From religious 
studies Voegelin borrows the term “Gnostic” for a particularly important group of such 
impostors.
Strauss disagrees, for him true political philosophy is always completely separated 
from the doxa of the common men or the pistis of religion. He is, in this respect, a great 
student of Plato. For Strauss, only the philosophers participate in the deeply rational 
understanding of politics and, indeed, their sole mission is to guard this understanding. 
Moreover, ordinary politics and religion is a threat to political philosophy, since it can 
lead to the persecution of philosophers.
PP 4 ’16 Dissenting voices within political theory Voegelin’s quest... 9
What Strauss agrees on with Voegelin, however, is that political thinkers should not 
seek direct power. Voegelin, nevertheless, permits some of them to seek power indi-
rectly, by explaining the nature of the symbols humans use in their political language. 
Strauss, especially in his polemic with Alexandre Kojève (1969), precludes this. Pure 
political philosophy has to be separated from political activity. The men and women 
who participate in real politics will naturally benefit from knowing political philosophy; 
but they can only treat it as a moral and intellectual exercise. True political philosophy 
for Strauss, by definition, cannot be translated into political action.
Voegelin’s path to political symbols
Voegelin was born in 1901 in Cologne. In 1922 he received his doctoral degree in 
Vienna, in law under Hans Kelsen, a famous neo-positivist scholar.3 Significantly, how-
ever, in his later work Voegelin became one of the most vociferous critics of positivism 
and the concept of progress. As for the methodological concerns, Voegelin described the 
‘positive’ approach as deeply reductionist. To counter this tendency, already in his early 
works Voegelin turned towards exploring the symbolic grounds of politics. He was still 
working at the University of Vienna at the time of the Austrian Anschluss. As a matter of 
fact, shortly before this event he published a work in which he addressed the theologico-
political problem of modern ideologies. The book was entitled Die Politischen Reli-
gionen (originally published in 1938), or simply Political Religions (Voegelin, 1999b). 
Voegelin, therefore, became one of the first authors to identify and describe the structural 
and symbolic similarities between modern political ideologies and religions (Gontier, 
2009, p. 1). At the same time, in another work published in the same period (in 1934), 
Voegelin criticized Carl Schmitt’s decisionism embodied in the concept of the total state 
(Voegelin, 1999a, pp. 58–63).
Schmitt’s philosophy, for Voegelin, was rooted in the vision of the metaphysical as an 
irrational, ‘Dionysian’ force that trumps any order. As Paul Gontier rightly claims:
“Transcendence does not have the same meaning for Schmitt and for Voegelin. For 
the former, it essentially means the radical heteronomy of a decision vis-à-vis all 
forms of legal rationality. For Voegelin, it refers to the subsumption of the legal 
order by a higher ethical and metaphysical order in which it finds its meaning. The 
two political structures are linked to two very different theological structures. Sch-
mitt’s decisionist political structure fits with a theology of potentia absoluta Dei, 
which finds its roots in late medieval Scotist or Ockhamist theologies. Voegelin 
refers to a theology of a Platonic type, for which the divine is not understood as 
radical otherness, but as the transcendent good toward which the human soul is 
naturally open” (2009, p. 3).
This approach also defines the calling of the student of political philosophy. Accord-
ing to Voegelin, the grand mission of political philosophy is precisely to draw a line be-
3 I am also preparing an article that deals with Voegelin’s intellectual biography in more detail, 
it will appear in Polish in the forthcoming first edition of the “Rambler” magazine. The working title 
of the article reads: “Voegelin – demonolog współczesności” [“Voegelin the Demonologist of Moder-
nity”].
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tween symbols that are grounded in a larger philosophical order and the violent arbitrari-
ness of politics grounded in raw force. He recognized potentia absoluta Dei, but believed 
that politics must never touch it or claim to hold it, even if it sees it on the distant horizon 
of pure spirituality. Of course, this made Voegelin more ‘Apollonian’, if we are to follow 
Nietzsche’s famous metaphor.
Moreover, looking for an order in faith created a troubled relation between Voegelin 
and Christianity. The German-American thinker on the one hand credited the Judeo-
Christian tradition with furnishing the West with its crucial political symbols, and on the 
other claimed that all the “the specifically modern problems of representation” had the 
same origin (Voegelin, 1987, p. 110). In other words, the modern ideologies Voegelin so 
despised would be impossible in the ordered world of the Greco-Roman political and 
religious symbols. And even if contemporary ideologies rejected the Judeo-Christian 
piety, they were still tied to its understanding of political philosophy and specifically the 
problem of reflecting the divine in the immanent. The cosmological question here was 
whether the metaphysical order has always permeated all being, or whether order was 
created in an arbitrary and violent act in which the reason of God conquered chaos. Order 
constitutes for Voegelin the basic political symbol, hence the title of his opus mangum 
(Order and History). For him, the creation of every temporal, political order was a sym-
bol of the mythical creation of the cosmos.
But, of course, most religions will hold that even after creation the world needs divine 
protection from chaos. In the same way, Voegelin was confident that every political order 
worthy of the name deserved protection from arbitrary violence. Therefore, in his early 
writings he tried to accomplish what he saw as the mission of a historian of political 
philosophy, by exposing the origins and character of totalitarian ideologies. He refers 
to this in a humorous story, mentioned in the Autobiographical Reflections, in which he 
describes his encounter with the Gestapo:
“…in the general survey of university personnel, a Gestapo officer came to our 
home and searched around my desk, drawers and bookcases in order to see what 
I did. […] First he inspected my desk for incriminating material […]. I had of course 
standing on my shelves the principal sources of a political nature: Hitler’s Mein 
Kampf, Kurt von Schuschnigg’s book, Dreimal Österreich; Mussolini’s Dottrina 
del Fascismo; and Marx’s Communist Manifesto. So he took away Schuschnigg 
and Marx. I protested that this would give an unfair impression of my political 
interests, which were strictly impartial and suggested that he take along Hitler’s 
Mein Kampf. But he refused…” (Voegelin, 1996, p. 54).
Of course, joking with the Gestapo could not get a specialist in political thought very 
far in inter-war Austria. Eventually, Voegelin had to emigrate to the USA. And it was 
there that he wrote all his major works. The 1958–1969 period which he spent back in 
Germany, at Munich’s Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, was, according to Voegelin’s 
own account, uneventful and left him embittered about the ethical and intellectual condi-
tion of post-war German academia.
Voegelin’s early works on religion and politics centered on the totalitarian notions of 
the society and the state. In the USA, however, he ventured to undertake a more complex 
criticism of modernity. This approach was visible especially in his famous New Science 
of Politics (1987), Order and History (2001) and From Enlightenment to Revolution 
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(1975). In the above works Voegelin tried to understand both the modern reductionistic 
thinking about politics and the antimonies of a civilization that so easily shifts from 
ideological frenzy into consumptionist apathy. Soon, Voegelin reached the conclusion 
that the essential element which combined all the major politico-philosophical problems 
of modernity was the attempt to overcome the tension between the immanent reality 
and what used to be “the Christian eschaton” (Voegelin, 1987, p. 166). This intuition 
may seem banal, but it is closely connected with Voegelin’s original and controversial 
interpretation of the history of political philosophy and his unique, ahistorical ontology 
of political phenomena.
As for the description of the subject matter of the history of political philosophy 
Voegelin, as John H. Hallowell puts it, became convinced “that it was societies and not 
ideas that were the real entities and that societies expressed themselves in history through 
a variety of complex symbols” (Hallowell, 1975, p. vi). Words like polis, republic, revo-
lution, progress and so on were, therefore, meant to express some hidden meaning on 
which the whole of society agreed, even if it differed about the concrete ideas it attached 
to those symbols. This use of the word “symbol” as opposed to “idea” or “ideology” is 
clearly visible when Voegelin describes Joseph de Maistre as just another man of the 
Enlightenment, who believed that will and argument alone can change society. Thus, for 
all his criticism of the Revolution and progress, de Maistre’s vision of politics, remained 
confined within progressive symbolism. To quote Voegelin:
“If we assume that de Maistre did not consider his work a vain exercise, we must 
also assume that he seriously believed he could change the course of Western his-
tory by a clear analysis of the problem of the crisis and by suggesting the only 
organizational solution that seemed to make sense. That the critical situation of the 
whole civilization that has been in the making for centuries cannot be transformed 
into a harmonious order over night by an act of insight and by an agreement be-
tween intelligent people, or that something might be profoundly wrong not only 
outside Catholicism but within the Church itself, was not sufficiently clear to him, 
just as it was inconceivable to Comte that he could not restore the order of a civili-
zation by his personal renovation or that anything could be wrong with his religion 
of humanity. In De Maistre as in Comte we sense the touch of enlightened reason 
that blinds the working of a spirit” (Voegelin, 1975, p. 184).
Symbols, however, by definition, need to refer to something. Hallowell in his de-
scription of Voegelinian symbolisms was deliberately coy and avoided going against 
the distinctively modern sensibilities. According to Voegelin, societies do not simply 
‘express themselves’, they express what they experience as the divine or, as some put it, 
‘transcendental’, order. Moreover, Voegelin does not hesitate to assume that a common 
ground for all those experiences does indeed exist, and he is not particularly worried 
that this ground has so far not been reached with the methodological tools developed by 
the natural sciences. In Anamnesis the thinker notes that “history becomes a structurally 
intelligible field of reality by virtue of the presence of the ground in which all men par-
ticipate” (Voegelin, 1978, p. 180). Of course the experiences of the ‘ground’ are subject 
to constant differentiation, but at the same time they have no clear vector of develop-
ment. Political symbolisms simply appear, develop and disappear within the framework 
of history grounded in divine experience, rather than in the divine experience grounded 
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in history as modern historicism, as its Hegelian, Comtian and Marxian versions would 
have it.
A problem occurs, however, when symbolisms become too stifled by the confines 
of the doctrine, since the doctrine always points towards the decisionist approach, i.e. 
some form of control, especially over the humans who express their experience of the 
transcendental. Of course, every society needs a doctrinal backbone, but at the same time 
it also needs to be open to new experience. In their extreme forms doctrines can become 
just a decisionistic cult of those who chose what is acceptable, overlooking the possibil-
ity of a common basis of all political symbols. As Voegelin himself observes, the prob-
lem of modern civilization is that “the symbols of ideological dogmatism dominating the 
Western societies… do not attempt to draw men into participation by persuasion, rather 
they constitute a language of obsession.” This, for Voegelin, is a path taken by those who 
“have closed themselves against the ground” (ibid., p. 187).
In the New Science of Politics Voegelin attempts to backtrace the intellectual gene-
alogy of such men and examine their inspirations. The line of philosophical heritage, 
according to him, starts with the ancient Gnostic sects, then develops into the millena-
rianism of Joachim of Fiore and finally finds its ways into modernity. Irrespective of 
the relevance of those historical musings the very ontology of the political phenomena 
used by Voegelin makes him a great dissenter as far as his understanding of the sci-
ence of politics is concerned. He, indeed, becomes what Ellis Sandoz calls the “mystic 
philosopher” (Sandoz, 2013, pp. 54–57). At the same time Voegelin agrees with the 
Cambridge School’s view that the beliefs which have influenced politics should not be 
judged against our contemporary standard of scientificity. For him, this, however, does 
not imply historical relativism. On the contrary, it compels the student of politics to 
search for a deeper ground that brings all the divergent political concepts together and at 
the same time is not just a necessary act in the historical unveiling of Hegel’s absolute as 
an “immanentization of the Christian eschaton” (Voegelin, 1987, p. 166).
Strauss’s path to the philosopher
Like Voegelin Strauss was a German émigré who, after fleeing the crumbling Weimar 
Republic, found a new homeland on the other side of the Atlantic. And like Voegelin, 
Strauss too was a famous critic of political modernity. This is, however, where the main 
similarities ended. We are now in the possession of the volume containing the corre-
spondence between the two thinkers (Cooper, Emberley, 1993). The study of those docu-
ments clearly confirms that for all their similarities in their search for the non-historicist 
elements of political philosophy the two thinkers differed sharply.
While Voegelin ultimately turned towards the divine ground of being as the source 
of political symbols, or purported source of false symbols, Strauss insisted on separat-
ing the revelation and the philosophical noêsis. He searched for the ultimate sources of 
differentiations within political philosophy, especially in the different approaches to the 
role of the political thinker and political philosophy. Again, just like Voegelin, Strauss 
separated the political philosophy proper from the instrumental use of political thought. 
For him, however, the essential discussion of political phenomena revolved around top-
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ics of a perennial, fundamental character, and thus thinking about them represented 
a value in itself, referring back to political thinking as a unique activity of the Platonic 
philosopher.
The disagreement between Voegelin and Strauss was especially sharp when it came 
to the role of revelation in discovering political symbols and their meaning. This is con-
firmed both in the letters themselves and in the interpretative essay by Voegelin’s fa-
mous student (Sandoz, 2006). Strauss’s firm stance on the separation of revelation and 
philosophy, and the constant tension between the two is further confirmed in another 
monographic work devoted to the theologico-political problem in Strauss’s philosophy 
(Meier, 2006). As Heinrich Meier puts it succinctly: “He [Strauss] considers faith insofar 
as it can be a challenge to the philosophical life” (2006, p. 20). Of course, the resulting 
dispute can be in some ways inspiring both to faith and philosophy. However, those two 
modes of thinking will always use different languages that will define their key terms in 
direct opposition to each other. “Does philosophy not become a special and conscious 
way of life solely insofar as it must assert itself against an authoritative objection? Does 
Calvin’s or Luther’s ‘No’ to the quid sit deus not draw attention to the central question?” 
– Meier notes (ibid., p. 28).
That is why Strauss is so suspicious of Voegelin’s analysis of the Gnostic origins of 
modernity. He actually eschews the whole Voegelinian teaching on political symbols 
as a representation of the human experience of the transcendental ground of being. For 
Strauss, political philosophy is separate from any imaginings based on revelation, which 
in Voegelin’s vocabulary is tantamount to the experience of “the ground.” In a letter to 
Voegelin, Strauss writes: “I deny that the ‘historical fact of the beginning of philosophy 
consists in the attitude of faith of Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, which you 
[E. Voegelin] assume. Whatever noein might mean, it is certainly not pistis in some 
sense” (in Emberley, 2004, p. 76). On the same ground Strauss criticizes Voegelin’s ideas 
about the gnostic genealogy of modernity. “Even if the lines from Joachim (de Fiore) to 
Hegel exist. They would not bring out the turn to the thoroughly ‘this-wordly’ philoso-
phy, that is from the eternal to a this-wordly process: one has to bring out as well the turn 
within philosophy” (ibid., p. 75) – Strauss notes.
In other words, if there is something that modernity immanentizes, for Strauss it is 
surely not the Christian eschaton. In spite of his dislike for the careless Popperian ap-
proach to Plato (ibid., pp. 66–69), Strauss is more inclined to think that it is classical phi-
losophy which in some strains of modernity becomes heedlessly superimposed on nature 
with some very dire political results. Strauss’s criticism of this pathology is based on his 
Socratic zetetic approach to political philosophy. This teaching consists in “a skeptical 
rebellion against both the traditional authorities and this original, antipolitical critique 
of those authorities” (Tarcov, Pangle, 1987, p. 922). What Socrates and Strauss turn to 
is the philosophical speech and liberal education that is “a preparation to philosophy” 
(Strauss, 1980, p. 13). At the same time such an education is open to the politics that hap-
pens among ordinary people, and in spite of being philosophically inspired discourages 
attempts to forcefully mold the masses into an improved community.
The belief that with the right means all men can be one day turned into civic persons 
resembling the Aristotelian spoudaios is for Strauss the fundamental flaw of modern 
political thought, and at the same time a conviction that all distinctively modern think-
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ers have in common. Strauss sees this assumption both in the Marxism of Alexandre 
Kojève (Strauss, 1991) and in the renaissance philosophy of Machiavelli, whom Strauss 
describes as the true father of modern political philosophy.
In his renowned work on Machiavelli, Strauss observers that true Machiavellianism 
does not consist in a simple rejection of idealism. Indeed, what Machiavelli attempts to 
do is to reach his own vision of the perfect state defined according to a “low but solid 
standard” (Strauss, 1984, p. 296). In a certain sense, Strauss agrees with Voegelin that the 
difference in standards (or ideas) is less important than the difference in the fundamental 
assumptions about history and order. And the fundamental assumption of modern politi-
cal philosophy is that philosophy can transform the whole society, and not just some of 
its admirers. All this new, ‘low’ standard does is enable philosophy to advocate a much 
broader use of violent, coercive methods in the attempt to bring the vision of a perfect 
city to life, rather than let it remain only a “city in speech.” According to Strauss, what 
one finds in Machiavelli’s books is a “manifestation of the new notion of philosophy 
which… understands man in the light of sub-human rather the super-human.” But, at the 
same time, Machiavelli changes the understanding of human nature only as the first step 
in a scheme to improve that nature and justify the means of such an improvement.
Yes, Machiavelli’s human is beastly, but at the same time the Platonic “myth of the 
metals” that describes the limitations to social engineering does not apply. Corrupt hu-
mans can be violently molded and perfected by persons of political virtue without any 
scruples, they are a universally malleable raw material. It is almost as if Machiavelli 
stepped down from the elevation of idealism to take a long run-up and eventually jump 
above it. As Strauss writes in the conclusion of his work on Machiavelli’s thought:
“…The scheme of a good society it projects is therefore likely to be actualized 
by men’s efforts…The good society in the new sense is possible always and eve-
rywhere since men of sufficient brain can transform the most corrupt people, the 
most corrupt matter, into an incorrupt one by the judicious application of the neces-
sary force” (ibid., p. 297).
Of course, Strauss sees the same political restlessness and the desire to achieve philo-
sophical goals with unphilosophical means in some of the sophists, the adversaries of 
the classical philosophers. However, only in modernity with Machiavelli does this trend 
become so prominent that it shapes how whole generations of educated men and women 
think about politics.
For Strauss, every form of historicism in describing the legacy of political thought 
goes back to this Machiavellian vision of politics. Similarly, for Voegelin every form of 
modern historicism goes back to Joachim de Fiore’s teleological vision of time. This is 
because, according to Strauss, historicism both in its Hegelian and contextual guise is 
evaluating all events from the point of view of present opinions or describing history as 
a mere game of impersonal forces (the Machiavellian “subhuman”). For Strauss, both 
approaches downplay the importance of philosophy and the perennial questions it asks. 
For him, all historicist methods of looking at history of philosophy fall short of searching 
for the truth as such.
As for the goal of studying political philosophy, it seems that Strauss adheres to the 
“old fashioned and simple opinion” (ibid., p. 9) according to which the aim of liberal 
education is to instill republican thinking about politics as a pursuit of the good of the 
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whole, in as many people as possible. Nevertheless, realistically one must assume that 
this idea will never be instilled in everyone. Therefore, the education needs to be limited 
to the spoudaios or “gentlemen”, i.e. those who show a genuine interest in republican 
politics and shun the materialism of the oligarchic youth.
The spoudaios is, however, still not a philosopher. A philosopher can in part de-
vote himself to the education of gentlemen, but it is not his most important pursuit. As 
Strauss’s students – Tarcov and Pangle put it in somewhat poetic eulogy:
“The only self-sufficient, solid, painless, and consuming or inexhaustible pleasure 
is the pleasure of thinking and knowing. The best life by nature, as opposed to 
convention or imagination, is therefore the life of the philosopher, who lives with 
a few like-minded friends as a more or less harmless parasite on the fringes of the 
society” (1987, p. 922).
Strauss, himself, remarks more dryly that a philosopher is “concerned with wisdom, 
for its own sake.” And perhaps for that reason “it is a piece of good luck if there is one 
alive in one’s own times” (quoted in ibid., p. 925).
The preoccupation with the unique nature of philosophy as an end in itself led Strauss 
to wonder whether true philosophers engage in the art of deception and concealing their 
genuine teaching from fear of persecution by an ignorant society (Strauss, 1980b). Such 
an explanation would, indeed, seem plausible, as philosophers are very often seen as 
those who disturb both the traditional prejudices of the society and the secretive machi-
nations of the sophists and the politicians. According to Strauss, even in the modern 
world, “the allegedly absolute tolerance turns into ferocious hatred of those who have 
stated most clearly and most forcefully that there are unchangeable standards founded 
in the nature of man and the nature of things” (Strauss, 1980a, p. 63). This teaching on 
“persecution and the art of writing” is perhaps the most controversial part of Strauss’s 
thought, and as such it cannot be discussed at length in this essay for brevity’s sake. Nev-
ertheless, let us note that in its most radical form the concept has been widely criticized, 
even by researchers who value other elements of Strauss’s thought.4
However, even without the “persecution” argument, Strauss’s teaching on the history 
of political philosophy ultimately becomes circular. In his view, a philosopher should 
not mix philosophical noêsis with political doxa not because s/he needs to preserve the 
separation between theory and life. The ethical concerns for the welfare of the society are 
not a viable argument either. The philosopher, according to Strauss, needs to limit his/her 
own desire to “immanentize” the good city simply in order to defend philosophy from 
the society, purely for philosophy’s sake.
Conclusions
Both Strauss and Voegelin attack historicism in search of objective truth. They, how-
ever, attack it from different angles. Voegelin searches for a metaphysical experience that 
grounds law and politics in a higher order. Strauss, seeks a pure philosophy that none of 
its adepts will dare to mix with the political doxa or religion. At the same time this pure 
4 For further discussion see (Kuz, 2013).
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philosophy of politics would explain all political phenomena to its students, or at least 
all the Western political phenomena.
Moving in those opposite directions, both thinkers strayed away from the standard 
self-perception of modern humans. As Allan Bloom puts it in his preface to Kojève’s 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, it is one of the most basic features of modern 
people to think “that thought is relative to time” (1969, p. x). Voegelin will thus strike 
them as a mystic who has no place in academia, and Strauss as a bookish admirer of the 
ancient Greeks who can only be confined to the lecture hall, and whose works have no 
significance for real politics.
Nevertheless, the urge to understand the most basic building blocks of political 
thought, the notions that do not change with time (or change very little) does return, and 
along with it the old Straussian and Voegelinian arguments. The political philosopher in 
the postmodern situation can, like Alasdair MacIntyre, defend the small “moral com-
munity” (1981, pp. 257–263) of the spoudaioses, or like Agata Bielik-Robson (2008) 
search for dii absconditi – hidden gods (and demons) in what used to be a neatly organ-
ized history of political thought. All such inquiries, however, follow in some way in the 
footsteps of Strauss and Voegelin.
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Zdania odrębne w teorii polityki: Voegelina badanie symboli 
i Straussa poszukiwanie filozofa 
 
Streszczenie
Artykuł opisuje metodologiczne podejścia Erica Voegelina oraz Leo Straussa w zakresie studiów 
nad historią myśli politycznej, zwłaszcza zaś historią zachodniej myśli politycznej. Artykuł stawia tezę, 
iż obaj myśliciele oddalają się od głównego nurtu metodologicznego, który jest obecnie reprezentowa-
ny przede wszystkim przez przedstawicieli kontekstualizmu. W swoich poszukiwaniach obaj podąża-
ją jednak zupełnie odmiennymi drogami. Voegelin skupia się na badaniu symboli politycznych i ich 
zakorzenienia w metafizycznych doświadczeniach ludzi je tworzących. Strauss natomiast bada raczej 
odwieczne pytania filozofii, stosuje też pojęcie klasycznej dyskursywnej racjonalności jako kryterium 
oceny odpowiedzi na kluczowe zagadnienia filozoficzne. Obaj myśliciele różnią się też w sposobie 
postrzegania roli filozofa polityki. Dla Voegelina miałby on/ona konserwować lub współtworzyć swe-
go rodzaju wiary polityczne. Dla Straussa zaś filozof to nauczyciel politycznie rozwiniętej młodzieży, 
a przede wszystkim obrońca samej filozofii, jako najszlachetniejszej formy działalności umysłowej. 
W końcowej części artykuł opisuje znaczenie obu autorów dla współczesnej myśli politycznej.
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